In the public debate, the idea of a common EU army becomes more and more popular. This especially when the USA calls NATO into question, other major countries like France try to push for the idea of a common army for the whole EU [Ivanov, 2011]. Forming the EU army would require to make full use of the potential of the Lisbon Treaty and more specifically its provisions related to Common Security and Policy (CSDP).
My contribution summarizes the proposals for an EU army and discusses the issue in the context of the EU CSDP/CFSP. In conclusion, I will assess the chances of success for a future common EU army.
Proponents of the idea of an EU army always based their aguments by drawing a comparison to the US army. As both the USA and the EU have nearly an equal GDP both have financially very similar capabilities. The underlying objective for the EU is to keep up with the USA and to become a more visible and influential actor in international relations. Therefore, an EU army is aimed not only at challenging the dominant positionof the USA in global politics but also at making the EU independent of the USA.
For the time being, the USA spends far more money and is far more efficient when it comes to military capabilities. On its side, the EU military capabilities are highly fragmented. Every country has its own military infrastructure and more or less its own military equipment. This leads to an important overlap of assets overlap between EU member states and results in a high degree of inefficiency.
The EU has made some limited attempts to tackle these issues within the boundaries of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which allows memberstates who are willing to deepen their defense cooperation to do so. It led to the creation of EUBattlegroups, which consist of 18 Battalions and can be deployed by a decision of the European Council. These limited attempts may come close to a potential EU army, but thy are still fall short of providing for sizeable and meaningful, not to say ready to use capabilities [Major & Molling, 2010]
When it comes to cost-intensive military defence projects, US companies are far bigger and more dominant on the market. Buying from US companies often reflects EU member states’ inefficiency not mentioning their inability to take advantage of potentially highly lucrative defence projects. Even if these raise another set of challenges, they would allow the EU to conclude more arm deals with the rest of the world, which would contribute to its prosperity [Hartley, 2003]
Looking at the current state of the EU, Brexit may alter the power distribution between NATO and the EU by making the former far more powerful and the latter even more dependent on it for its defence. Indeed, Great Britain and France are the most important providers when it comes to military capabilities. A British exit from the EU would lead to a significant decrease in EU’s military capabilities. This would increase the pressure on the larger member states to increase their own military capabilities by boosting their defence budgets. But this may hardly suffice.
So, if the arguments for a EU army can appear quite convincing for some member states, its concrete implementation remains uncertain. Indeed, when it comes to funding such an army, it would be common sense to expect that member states contribute on the basis of their respective GDP. But when one looks at the current levels of spending of each member state for their armed forces, substantial differences persist. This would create an additional obstacle as we all know how difficult it is for the EU member states to agree when it comes to financial negotiations.
A common EU army would also require major member states to take a more pro-active role. As the major decision-makers in this field are still the European Council and the Council, decisions very much lie in the hands of the member states. But countries like Germany are reluctant to take on such role as are attached to a less active foreign and security policy. For other member states, a EU army would be welcome as it would mean higher defense expenditures and more involvement in international conflicts. In either way, the question of a EU army may challenge the positions of some member states and this is may in itself create yet another possible obstacle.
Then, a question raised by the prospect of an EU army relates to its democratic legitimacy. Indeed, in some member states, the decisions to use military force requires approval by Parliament. But applying this to the EU would result in other problems as the Council may just not be able to take any decision.
Furthermore, the integration of the military forces of the EU member states would constitute a very significant step towards greater integration of the EU’s foreign policy. It would improve the efficiency and give the EU foreign policy a new powerful too by enabling the EU to keep up with major global military powers such as China or the USA.
Giving up on a EU army may conversely be welcome by some member states that see it as a question of national sovereignty. Conversely, giving up on their own armed forces would reflect their commitments to the EU [Moravscik, 2003). That being said, when one looks at the current problems with countries like Hungary or Poland, it is difficult to see how these are able to fully commit to the EU project in general, not mentioning to an EU army.
Therefore, it is still unclear how the EU will be able to provide for an efficient and legitimate decision making when dealing with these issues while taking account of the reluctance, of some member states to further surrendering their national sovereignty.
It looks like EU institutions may just not be ready for a EU army. A new major treaty might be needed to resolve the question of decision making on the use of such an army. Currently, PESCO gives a good opportunity to test the member states’ commitments to develop military cooperation between themselves.
Finally, the creation of a EU army raises the question of the compatibility between the different strategic cultures among the member states. Indeed, some member states are more reluctant than others to use their armed forces. So, if the EU wants to have an efficient army, it will have to find a way to reconcile these differences [Cornish & Edwards, 2005]. Perhaps, for now the EU should stick to what it does best, i.e. as a recognised leader in civilian operations and just leave military operations to NATO.
REFERENCES
Cornish, P. & Edwards, G. [2005]. The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report. International affairs, 81(4), 801-820. Link: https://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Paul%20Cornish%20and%20Georffrey%20Edwards,%20The%20Strategic%20Culture%20of%20the%20European%20Union,%20A%20progress%20report.pdf
Hartley, K. [2003]. The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(2), 107-115.
Ivanov, I. D. [2011]. Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities. Lexington Books.
Major, C. & Molling, C. [2010]. EU Military Capabilities – Some European Troops, but not yet a European Army. In E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri (eds.) EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making, IAI, November, pp. 7-11. Link: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/quaderni_e_19.pdf
Moravcsik, A. [2003]. How Europe can win without an army. Financial (Comment and Analysis), 3. Link: https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/FT_4-3-03.pdf